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Dr. Smyth's book is necessarily a study of the Christian Ideal of Life and Conduct. It divides itself into two parts, of which the first is an exhaustive analysis of the Ideal (1) in its contents, (2) in its historical realizations in the Person of Christ, (3) in the various forms in which it is to be practically realized in humanity. The second part deals in detail with Christian duties and closes with a discussion of the Christian moral motive power. We commend the book as the latest, and probably the best, scientific discussion of the greatest and most important of all subjects.

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*Introduction to Physiological Psychology.* By Dr. Theodor Ziehen, Professor in Jena; Translated by C. C. Van Liew and Dr. Otto Beyer. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1892. 12mo, pp. 284.

THIS work is chiefly valuable as a statement of the position of the most advanced wing of the evolutionists in psychology. It is an effort to explain the phenomena of the "self" while denying that there is really any self to explain, to account for the facts of consciousness without admitting that there is any conscious subject. The "ego" with Professor Ziehen is purely factitious—it is merely "a peculiar complex of associated images of memory." He recognizes the "empirical ego," indeed, but finds no place for the "pure ego." He says (p. 218): "The reflective person, of course, reduces this complexity of the ego-idea to relative simplicity by placing his own ego, as subject of his sensations, ideas and motions, over against all objects and other egos of the external world. To be sure, this simplification of the ego-idea by placing it as subject in opposition to the rest of the world as object, has a deep foundation in epistemology; but regarded purely in the light of psychology, this simple ego is but a theoretical fiction. Empirical psychology recognizes only that complex ego whose chief characteristic features we have just briefly described."

This is to be strictly scientific and empirical! But how is

it that the one persistent and ever-present experience—the centre of the out-and-in-go of any and all experiences—the self is to be thrust out of the empirical category? Is it because we have no better ground for knowing it than that we are compelled to know it as a condition precedent in all experience? Is experience made better by the denial that there is any such thing as an experienter to have experiences?

Of course, with such a clean sweep as this, there is no room for voluntary activities of any sort. Professor Ziehen admits that there are certain actions which *seem* to be voluntary [to whom? to what?] but they only seem. "There is no special faculty of the will," certain movements "we are especially inclined to designate as *voluntary* actions, *καὶ ἐξουχῆν*. This tendency, assisted by the fancy that we act from choice in the association of ideas, has led to the assumption of a special faculty of will. But that which we call will, on strict analysis, is reduced essentially to the sensations of tension accompanying the association of ideas and the action. The feeling that we exercise a free choice in the association of ideas and in action, is easily explained by the fact that, in distinction from automatic acts, association and action are not only determined by external stimuli, but are also influenced by ideas, the sum total of which we may designate as our empirical 'ego.' A definite action must follow certain external stimuli and certain ideas according to an inevitable law of causation, just as a stone detached from its support *must* fall in a certain direction with a certain velocity." (p. 28.)

This is the most thoroughgoing materialism we have encountered in many a day. The popular sensationalism of the day is so shuffling on this point that it is refreshing to have it plumped out now and then in all its baldness. As a further specimen, take the following on page 22: "It is possible to conceive that all our actions, even the most complicated, abstractly considered, have a purely mechanical or material cause. Ordinarily we imagine that all the compli-

cated actions of human life are more easily explained by introducing the help of psychical processes. The opposite is correct; all actions, even the fittest and most complicated, can be understood as the effect of the material processes of the brain."

If this be science, one feels a sort of compassion for the great lights of modern scientific thought; they are so far behind the sweep of the times. Almost with one voice they repudiate and scorn such bald materialism—indeed all materialism, as it would be easy to show. No man who comprehends and accepts the first law of Newton, can be a materialist, for by that law nothing which is inert can change its state; and, therefore, if matter is all, and is inert, there is no such thing as change in the world; if it be not inert, then it possesses that quality which removes it from the category of dead matter, and the life-factor is assumed as a *prius*.

Space will not allow further consideration of this subject, but it is reassuring to think that the long-standing controversy between the Transcendentalists and Sensationalists is in a fair way to be adjusted by the full recognition of personality, with its inherent potentialities, as the one dominant fact of all knowledge—a fact implied in all experience. As Professor Huxley in his *Hume* puts it: "The organ of thought, *prior to experience*, may be compared to an untouched piano, in which it may be properly said that music is innate, inasmuch as its mechanism contains, potentially, so many octaves of musical notes. The unknown cause of sensation which Descartes calls the 'je ne sais quoi dans les objets,' or 'choses telles qu'elles sont;' and Kant the 'Noumenon,' or 'Ding an sich;' is represented by the musician, who, by touching the keys, converts the potentiality of the mechanism into sounds. A note so produced is the equivalent of a single experience." Professor Huxley abundantly recognizes elsewhere the impossibility of explaining sensation in terms of matter; and so do Herbert Spencer, Professor Tyndall, and all the great leaders of Empiricism. F. A. S.